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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1832, Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v. Georgia,1
unsuccessfully attempted to prevent President Andrew Jackson's
removal of Georgia's Native American population in what has
subsequently come to be known as the Trail of Tears.2 Several years
before this famously unenforced decision, Marshall wrote a letter to
Justice Story:
It was not until after the adoption of our present government that
respect for our own safety permitted us to give full indulgence to
those principles of humanity and justice which ought always to
govern our conduct towards the aborigines when this course can be
pursued without exposing ourselves to the most afflicting
calamities. This time however is unquestionably arrived; and every
oppression now exercised on a helpless people depending on our
magnanimity and justice for the preservation of their existence,
impresses a deep stain on the American character. I often think with
indignation of our disreputable conduct-as I think it-in the affair
of the Creeks of Georgia. 3
A stain it was, but the Trail of Tears is not the lone blemish of
banishment soiling the American character.
In the United States, we banish. For example, in 1637, the General
Court of Massachusetts, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, banished
Anne Hutchinson after she propounded her unorthodox views on
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
2. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 113-14 (1984);
see also Bethany R. Berger, "Power Over This Unfortunate Race:" Race, Politics and Indian Law in
United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1983 (2004).
3. BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 118.
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personal justification.4 In 1830, President Andrew Jackson's approval of
the Indian Removal Act commenced the Trail of Tears and the brutal
banishment of Native Americans living east of the Mississippi that
Marshall and the Supreme Court could not stop.5 Similarly, in 1882,
Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act, denying citizenship to all
Chinese immigrants.6 Another example of banishment occurred on
February 19, 1942, when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order
9066, empowering General DeWitt to banish people of Japanese descent
from the West Coast.7 These incidents are among the most tragic in a
history studded with vagrancy laws, loitering laws, and the unlegislated
efforts of countless municipal police officers who, with varying levels of
coercion, moved the "unclean" from within their town lines.
8
Inevitably, decades later, we are contrite. 9 Yet today the tradition of
community cleansing through exclusion thrives in Washington State in
4. Jeffrey A. Brauch, John Winthrop: Lawyer as Model of Christian Charity, I I REGENT U. L.
REV. 343, 34849 (1999).
5. See Josephine Johnston, Resisting a Genetic Identity: The Black Seminoles and Genetic
Tests ofAncestry, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 262, 264 (2003).
6. Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After
-9/111?" 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. No. 2, 315, 318 (2003).
7. Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U.L. Rev. 1017, 1021 (2003).
8. For an excellent discussion on the history of vagrancy laws and their function, see
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
9. In 2000, Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary of the Indian Affairs Department of the Interior,
apologizing on behalf of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for its role in the Trail of Tears, promised:
Never again will this agency stand silent when hate and violence are committed against
Indians. Never again will we allow policy to proceed from the assumption that Indians possess
less human genius than the other races. Never again will we be complicit in the theft of Indian
property. Never again will we appoint false leaders who serve purposes other than those of the
tribes. Never again will we allow unflattering and stereotypical images of Indian people to
deface the halls of government or lead the American people to shallow and ignorant beliefs
about Indians. Never again will we attack your religions, your languages, your rituals, or any
of your tribal ways. Never again will we seize your children, nor teach them to be ashamed of
who they are. Never again.
Remarks of Kevin Grover, Ass't Sec'y-lndian Affairs Dep't of the Interior at the Ceremony
Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sept. 8,
2000, available at http://www.tahtonka.com/apology.html.
In 1988, President George H. W. Bush wrote a letter of apology to those of Japanese descent
who had been forced into internment camps, stating:
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful memories;
neither can they fully convey our nation's resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the
rights of individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the past. But we can take a
clear stand for justice and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese
Americans during World War II.
In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology, your fellow
Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their traditional commitment to the ideas
of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your family have our best wishes for the
future.
SOAP Orders
the form of municipal probationary "Stay Out of Areas of Prostitution"
("SOAP") orders. As will be described below, SOAP orders take on
several different forms in many of the towns and cities of northwestern
Washington, but in each locality where the orders are used, they function
in much the same way: An individual arrested for a prostitution-related
offense is issued a SOAP order as a probationary condition; the order,
typically in force for two years, requires the individual to remain outside
those areas of the city deemed to be areas of prostitution, and mere
presence in such an area will be considered a probationary violation. 10
It may seem that SOAP orders are trivial when compared to the
types of banishment discussed above, but alarms should go off whenever
we begin blithely attaching metaphors of cleansing to human beings and
then wash people from our communities. Unfortunately, in Washington,
this community cleansing project has triggered no widespread alarm.
Prostitution has always occupied a contested and ambiguous space
within our culture. To truly begin to understand the socio-cultural
mechanisms and forces that have allowed individuals living in
prostitution to be reduced to the status of pollutants would require a
sociological analysis beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this
Comment focuses only on the legal mechanism of probation that is the
medium of this cleansing project.
SOAP orders represent a breakdown in the probationary system.
Originally, municipal trial courts were given extraordinary discretion in
their construction of probationary conditions on the premise that
rehabilitation, the original focus of probation, required individually
tailored orders." SOAP orders as contemplated were to be built upon the
sentencing court's factual knowledge about the specific defendant
appearing before the court. 12 SOAP orders as they have come to be are
the antithesis of this dynamic, representing mechanized production-line
justice that no longer embraces the goal of individual rehabilitation, and
is instead geared toward a project of social engineering that is largely
without check. Although this discretion was initially justified by the trial
court's particularized knowledge of individual defendants, the deference
it has come to command on the appellate level continues despite the total
erosion of its theoretical base in the context of SOAP orders.
President George H. W. Bush Apology available at http://www.scu.edu/SCU/Programs/Diversity/
exhibit2.html (last visited July 10, 2004).
10. DEBRA BOYER ET AL., NORTHWEST RESOURCE ASSOCIATES, SURVIVAL SEX IN KING
COUNTY: HELPING WOMEN OUT 5 (1993).
11. For a discussion of the discretion exercised by municipal trial courts in the imposition of
probationary conditions, see Part III.A infra.
12. Id.
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In Washington, precedent supports the application of a heightened
level of appellate scrutiny to probationary conditions that infringe on
fundamental liberties, but this scrutiny is often inconsistently applied and
frequently heightened in name alone.1 3 This Comment argues that,
because the justification for appellate court deference toward the trial
courts' creation of probationary conditions has disappeared in the context
of SOAP orders, appellate courts faced with such orders should more
rigorously examine the trial court decisions. This heightened scrutiny is
justified because SOAP orders infringe on the state-recognized right of
intrastate travel. Further, based on an examination of the research on the
factors that lead to prostitution and keep individuals in the prostitution
industry, a more rigorous review will make it evident that SOAP orders
rarely accomplish the historic or currently articulated goals of probation:
rehabilitation, prevention of future offense, or community safety.
Part II provides background information on the use of SOAP orders
in Western Washington, state and federal court decisions calling for
heightened scrutiny of probationary orders that infringe on fundamental
rights, challenges to SOAP-related probationary orders in other
jurisdictions, and constitutional challenges to probationary orders in
Washington. Part III discusses the historical roots of probation and
argues, for the above reasons, that appellate deference to SOAP orders
cannot be justified on these traditional grounds. Part III also presents
information on research into the factors that lead individuals into
prostitution and argues that due to these factors, in the majority of
instances, SOAP orders are incapable of accomplishing the goals of
probation.
II. BACKGROUND ON SOAP ORDERS AND APPELLATE REVIEW OF
PROBATIONARY CONDITIONS
Before exploring the failure of the probationary system represented
by SOAP orders and the general inability of such orders to accomplish
the goals of probation, it is necessary to understand both the application
of SOAP orders in Washington and the possible avenues of constitutional
challenge to probationary conditions that infringe on fundamental rights.
Section A outlines the use of SOAP orders in several representative
cities, relying principally on Seattle's use of the orders as a model.
Section B describes the precedent for heightened review of certain
probationary orders and examines the inconsistent nature and rigor of
this scrutiny. Section C consists of two parts. First, although SOAP
orders have not been challenged at the appellate level in Washington,
13. See Section II.B and cases cited therein.
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subpart one of section C examines constitutionally based challenges to
various ordinances and probationary conditions that resemble SOAP
orders in other states and in federal court. Subpart two of section C
examines constitutionally based appellate challenges in Washington
courts of probationary conditions that employ pre-existing exclusionary
zones that are similar to those used in SOAP orders.
A. SOAP Orders in Washington State
In Washington, as in most states, prostitution is prohibited as a
misdemeanor both by state statute 4 and municipal ordinances.' 5 The
majority of prosecutions for prostitution take place in municipal courts.16
In Seattle and in several surrounding municipalities, persons who plead
guilty to or are convicted for a prostitution violation may receive, as a
condition of probation, 17 a SOAP order. 18  SOAP orders require
individuals to remain outside predetermined areas of the city upon
penalty of arrest. Some municipalities establish the terms of SOAP
orders and their areas by ordinance.' 9 In other municipalities, such as
Seattle, SOAP areas are defined by the city attorney's office and imposed
by the municipal court. Additionally, in some cities," the order prohibits
the individual's presence twenty-four hours a day for the probationary
period, while in other cities, the order may cover only certain times of
the day.2' The size of the coverage area varies by city. As of 2003,
Seattle contained five SOAP areas covering 3.2 square miles total,
including one encompassing virtually the entire downtown business
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.030(3) (2002).
15. See, e.g., SEArTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.10.020 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Superior Court 2003 Annual Caseload Report 22, available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/caseload/ (last visited July 19, 2004) (indicating that in 2003, Superior
Courts in Washington, the courts of general jurisdiction, handled 259 misdemeanor cases); see also
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 2003 Annual Caseload Report 24, available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/caseload/ (last visited July 19, 2004) (indicating that the District Courts,
the courts of limited jurisdiction, handled 50,202 non-traffic misdemeanors).
17. In Washington, municipal courts are empowered to defer or suspend the sentences of those
who violate municipal criminal ordinances under either WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.255 (2002) (for
cities over 400,000) or WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.330 (2002) (all other cities).
18. BOYER ET AL., supra note 10.
19. See, e.g., EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE §10.24.210 (2004); BREMERTON, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 9.24.072 (1997); CITY OF SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.05.650 (2004).
20. See id. §§ 10.24.210; 9.24.072; 8.05.650.
21. Because Seattle's SOAP orders are not created by ordinance, it is possible that individual
orders may vary, but most Seattle SOAP orders exclude individuals on either a twenty-four-hour
basis or during the nineteen hours between I I a.m. and 6 a.m. BOYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 5.
Additionally, given that the City of Seattle Map Department has prepared a GIS map that designates
specific SOAP areas, it appears likely that the orders seldom vary in terms of areas covered.
2004]
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district and City Hall. 22 SOAP orders are generally in force for two
years. 2' The following two exhibits show SOAP areas and available
crime statistics within the City of Seattle. 2
4
Exhibit 1
Prostitution Charges Rise in Seattle;
More Occur in Census Tracts Containing SOAP Areas
Criminal Vice and Prostitution Offenses 1996-2003
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22. Seattle SOAP area information based on a 2003 GIS map prepared by the City of Seattle,
on file with the author. The SOAP zones include roughly 1.2 square miles for a two-block wide strip
of Aurora Avenue from Denny Way to N.E. 145th Street; 0.4 square miles in the downtown
neighborhood for an area from Virginia Street to Columbia Street and from Ninth Avenue to First
Avenue; 0. 1 square miles in the Pike/Pine corridor from Ninth to Tenth Avenues; 0.3 square miles in
the International District for an area from Sixth Avenue to to 21st Avenue S. and from S. Weller
Street to E. Fir Street; 1.2 square miles in the Rainer Valley from S. Fontanelle Street to Charlestown
Street; and 0.1 square miles in South Seattle for an area from Dallas Avenue S. to S. Donovan Street
and from 14th Avenue S. to Sixth Avenue S. See Exhibit 2, infra.
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.255 (2001) and WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.330 (2001) provide
for a two-year maximum on probationary conditions for prostitution.
24. City of Seattle Police Department, Crime Data, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/
crime/default.htm (last visited July 10, 2004) (Exhibit 1). Map from: City of Seattle Police
Department (1990), Census Tracts by Precinct: at http://www.cityofseattle.net/Police/Maps/
census.htm (last visited July 10, 2004) (Exhibit 2). The SOAP areas on the map are approximated
based on GIS maps produced by the City of Seattle Public Utilities Office, on file with the author.
For the most part, the arguments presented in Part Ill of this comment assume that SOAP orders
have been effective in curbing prostitution in the direct areas that they affect. However, the data
presented below demonstrates that, despite the longstanding existence of SOAP areas, prostitution
arrests remain much higher in the census tracks in which these areas exist than in other census
tracks. This raises factual questions about whether SOAP orders do in fact even deter prostitution in
their specific areas of application. These questions, however, are difficult to answer because many
variables, such as enforcement rate and disposition of police encounters with suspected prostitutes,
remain unquantified. Part Ill of this comment directly addresses the broader question of whether
SOAP orders are effective means of achieving the goals of probation.
2004] SOAP Orders 179
Exhibit 2
City of Seattle SOAP areas
outlined in black on map
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B. Heightened Scrutiny of Probationary Conditions That
Infringe on Fundamental Rights
In Washington, probationary conditions imposed after conviction
for a misdemeanor offense are not frequently challenged on appeal.
Because probation25 is considered a "matter of grace, privilege, or
clemency granted to the deserving, and withheld from the undeserving,
as sound official discretion may dictate," 26 probationary conditions are
reviewed under the least rigorous standard27 and trial courts are very
rarely reversed.2 8 However, as the discussion below will demonstrate,
when probationary conditions infringe on fundamental rights, appellate
courts, on both the state and federal level, ostensibly apply a somewhat
heightened standard of review. This heightened standard, however, is
inconsistently applied and underdeveloped. This section explores the
development and application of this review standard in Washington.
Washington's standard of review for probationary conditions that
infringe on fundamental rights is based, in part, on United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez.29  In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that
"[c]onditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable
constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny" and
"that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be done sensitively and
with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the broad
purposes of the Probation Act.",30 Consuelo-Gonzalez was initially
interpreted as calling for a fairly rigorous three-part test that required an
appellate court to evaluate whether (1) the trial court's purpose in
imposing the condition was permissible; (2) the condition had
substantially greater impact than was necessary to carry out the purpose
of the condition; and (3) the condition served a legitimate need of law
25. In Washington, probation is regulated under separate statutory authorities depending on
whether the underlying offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.20.255;
3.50.330 (2002) (applicable to misdemeanors); 9.94A.505(8) (2002), (applicable to felonies and
otherwise known as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 ("SRA"). The SRA contains explicit
restrictions on the conditions of probation, which, in many cases, require that probationary
conditions must be related to the offense. However, the above statutes empowering municipal courts
to order probation require only that "probation as in [the court's] opinion is reasonable and necessary
under the circumstances of the case." Id. § 35.20.255 (2002). In State v. Wilkerson, 107 Wash. App.
748, 754-55, 31 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2001), for example, the court held that probationary conditions for
misdemeanor violations were not required to be crime related but must only "bear a reasonable
relation to the defendant's duty to make restitution or ... tend to prevent the future commission of
crimes."
26. State v. Williams, 97 Wash. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687, 691 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), cited in State v. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d 22, 37-38,
846 P.2d 1365, 1374 (1993).
30. Id. at 265.
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enforcement. 3' However, although Consuelo-Gonzalez has not been
overruled and continues to be cited in cases dealing with probationary
conditions that infringe on fundamental rights,3 2  its open-ended
requirement of "special scrutiny" has lost what teeth it had and has been
inconsistently applied, even within the Ninth Circuit. 33
In Washington, probationary conditions may infringe on
fundamental rights so long as they are "sensitively imposed" and are
"reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and
the public order. 3 4 As with the Consuelo-Gonzalez standard on the
federal level, these criteria for assessing "sensitivity" and the "essential
needs of the state and public order" are poorly articulated and the
standard is applied with inconsistent rigor. Generally, when reviewing
probationary orders against constitutional challenges, Washington courts
examine the breadth of the restriction in relation to the condition's
potential for preventing the defendant from re-offending.3 5 Thus, the
rigor of the court's review will depend on the particularity with which it
is willing to understand the defendant's crime and the related question of
the nature of the risk posed by the defendant. The following examples
indicate that some courts are willing to justify probationary conditions
that infringe on fundamental rights based on generalizations about the
type of crime committed, while others reject such generalizations or
statistical correlations and require a particularized showing that the
condition in question is appropriate for the defendant on which it is
imposed.
Washington courts appear most willing to apply a searching level of
review in cases where probationary orders infringe on the fundamental
rights of parents to control the care and custody of their children.3 6 For
31. See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980).
32. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Bahe, 201 F.3d
1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000).
33. Compare United States v. Fukushima, No. 90-10219, 1991 WL 80343, at *3 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez for the principle that probationary conditions that infringe on
fundamental rights must be "carefully reviewed.") with Bahe, 201 F.3d at 1127-28 (citing Consuelo-
Gonzalez for the principle that a probationary condition that infringes on a fundamental right need
only be "reasonably said to contribute significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person
and to the protection of the public.") and United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1383 (6th Cir.
1984) (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez for the principle that a probationary condition that infringes on
otherwise inviolable constitutional rights must in fact "serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and
public safety").
34. State v. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365, 1374 (1993).
35. See, e.g., id.
36. Although an examination of the cases dealing with probationary orders that infringe on
fundamental rights appears to demonstrate that the rigor of the review depends, to some degree, on
the relative weight the court assigns to the fundamental right infringed upon, the courts themselves
generally do not acknowledge this. For example, in State v. McBride, 74 Wash. App. 460, 465, 873
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example, in State v. Letourneau,37 a teacher pleaded guilty to two counts
of second degree child rape of one of her students.38 As a condition of
her release, the trial court required the defendant to have no unsupervised
contact with children, including her own.3 9 The court held that
"limitations on fundamental rights during community custody terms that
help prevent the criminal from further criminal conduct for the duration
of his or her sentence are constitutional ... [so long as] such limitations
[are] reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the
state.",40 Although evidence indicated that one evaluator believed that the
defendant posed a risk to her children, 41 and the court conceded that
individuals who sexually abuse unrelated children often "later offend
against their own children, 42 the court nonetheless held that for such a
restriction to be valid, the state must supply specific and individualized
evidence that the particular defendant in question posed a risk to her
children. Generalizations based on the nature of the crime were an
"insufficient basis for State interference with fundamental parenting
rights. 43 Thus, in Letourneau, the court defined the defendant's crime
very narrowly and differentiated the risk posed by the defendant based
on the age of the children in question and their relationship with the
defendant.44 Because of this, the probation conditions appeared to the
court as too broad to accomplish the concededly compelling state interest
in the protection of children from sexual predators.45 Courts have
rejected such generalizations as the basis for probationary conditions in
other situations as well.46
In other situations, courts engage in a much less particularized
examination of the defendant's crime and risk of re-offense and uphold
P.2d 589, 593 (1994), the court held that whether a probationary statute infringes on speech or
expressive rights or the acknowledged fundamental right to intrastate travel was immaterial for the
purposes of review.
37. 100 Wash. App. 424, 997 P.2d 436 (2000).
38. Id. at 426, 997 P.2d at 438.
39. Id. at 430, 997 P.2d at 440.
40. Id. at 438, 997 P.2d at 444.
41. Id. at 439-40, 997 P.2d at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See generally State v. Ancira, 107 Wash. App. 650, 654, 27 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2001)
(holding that the defendant's violation of a domestic violence no-contact order issued to protect the
defendant's wife did not justify a probationary condition that prevented the defendant from seeing
his children) and State v. Riles, 135 Wash. 2d 326, 353, 957 P.2d 655, 668 (1998) (holding that a
probationary condition that the defendant, who was convicted of raping a nineteen year old, have no
contact with minors could not be justified on the basis that the victim's youthful appearance may
have influenced the defendant's choice of her as a victim).
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more broadly sweeping probationary conditions that infringe on
fundamental rights. For example, in State v. Riley, the defendant was
convicted of computer trespass and possession of a stolen access device
for use in his home computer to obtain long distance telephone access
codes.47 In addition to prohibiting him from owning a home computer,
the court prohibited the defendant from associating with computer
"hackers" and communicating on computer bulletin boards.48 The
defendant challenged the latter two conditions on the basis that they
unduly interfered with his fundamental right of association.4 9 Whereas in
Letourneau the court required a particularized showing that the
restrictions interfering with the defendant's rights were linked with the
particular defendant's criminal proclivities, thus rejecting a generalized
or statistical correlation,5 ° the court in Riley did not establish or require
any specific or individualized link between computer "hackers,"
computer bulletin boards, and the defendant's particular crime. Instead,
the court simply concluded that the conditions would help prevent the
defendant from reoffending, with little supporting reasoning for its
holding.5 '
C. Constitutionally Based Challenges to Probationary Orders That
Infringe on the Right of Intrastate Travel
As described in the previous section, fundamental rights-based
challenges to probationary conditions imposed as a result of
misdemeanor conviction pose the greatest likelihood of triggering
meaningful review. Although SOAP orders infringe on First Amendment
rights of association,52 Washington courts, like several other state courts
and federal appellate courts, have recognized that the federal constitution
protects a fundamental right of intrastate travel.53 Because SOAP orders
more directly affect the right to travel than the right to association and
because SOAP orders have been successfully challenged on this basis in
other jurisdictions,54 a challenge based on the infringement of the right to
travel is the most likely avenue of success. This section describes
47. State v. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d 22, 25, 846 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1993).
48. Id. at 27, 846 P.2d at 1368.
49. Id. at 38-39, 846 P.2d at 1374.
50. State v. Letourneau, 100 Wash. App. 424, 442, 997 P.2d 436, 446 (2000).
51. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d at 38, 846 P.2d at 1374.
52. Sandra L. Moser, Anti-Prostitution Zones: Justification for Abolition, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1101, 1111 (2001) (discussing First Amendment implications of SOAP orders).
53. Eggert v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 840, 842, 505 P.2d 801, 803-04 (1973) (holding that the
First Amendment of the federal constitution protects intrastate travel).
54. See. e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), discussed infra, notes
74-90.
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challenges to SOAP orders and related probationary orders on the basis
of the right of intrastate travel. Subpart one describes cases from other
jurisdictions that have examined SOAP-like probationary orders,
ordinances, and injunctions. Subpart two discusses several analogous
Washington cases that have dealt with probationary restrictions that
infringe on the right of intrastate travel.
1. Constitutionally Based Challenges to Restrictions on Intrastate Travel
in the Context of Prostitution in Jurisdictions Other Than Washington
Because of the rarity of appellate cases dealing with misdemeanant
probationary orders, it is difficult to develop a clear picture of how
different state courts would approach the use of pre-existing exclusionary
zones in probation conditions. Several state courts have addressed the
use of probationary conditions that require defendants to remain outside
particular areas,55 but in general the orders have been ostensibly created
for the specific defendant at bar.
In the specific area of prostitution, a number of state courts have
upheld as constitutional the use of exclusionary conditions that do not
employ pre-existing zones in a probation order. In Alaska and Illinois,
for example, such orders may be used where the area is defined with
specificity, the area is limited and not unnecessarily broad, and the order
allows "for access to the area for legitimate purposes and at reasonable
times, when the need for such access exists. ' '56 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii has upheld the exclusionary conditions of a probationary
order for a prostitution violation where the exclusion was limited to
nighttime hours. 57 Courts in other states have permitted a more complete
exclusion.58
In re White59 was one of the earliest challenges to the use of pre-
existing exclusionary zones as probationary conditions for prostitution
violations. In this California case, the defendant pleaded guilty to
soliciting an act of prostitution. 60 As part of her probation, she was
55. For a detailed discussion of such cases, see Michael George Smith, The Propriety and
Usefulness of Geographical Restriction Imposed as Conditions of Probation, 47 BAYLOR L. REV.
571 (1995); see also Carroll J. Miller, Annotation, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on
Defendant's Not Entering Specified Geographical Area, 28 A.L.R. 4th 725 (2004).
56. Oyoghok v. Municipality of Anchorage, 641 P.2d 1267, 1270 n.4 (Alaska App. 1982); see
also People v. Pickens, 542 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (I1. App. 1989).
57. State v. Stanford, 900 P.2d 157, 161 (Haw. 1995).
58. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 389 So.2d 364, 366-67 (La. 1980) (probationary condition
prohibiting the defendant from entering the French Quarter of New Orleans was upheld because it
was based upon the theory that the defendant's rehabilitation would best be served by removing her
from an area frequented by prostitutes).
59. 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
60. Id. at 563.
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required, for a two-year period, to remain outside three pre-established"map areas" in which high rates of prostitution took place.6' Although
the defendant challenged the condition both as an undue infringement on
her First Amendment rights and on her right to intrastate travel protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the appellate court focused primarily on
the latter right.62 The court acknowledged that trial courts have wide
discretion to create probationary conditions that "foster rehabilitation"
and "protect the public," but held that "[w]here a condition of probation
requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be
narrowly drawn; to the extent it is overbroad, it is not reasonably related
to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. 63 The
court went on to find that the condition was overly broad, reasoning, in
part, that there are "innumerable situations in which a probationer could
be in the map area which are unrelated to prostitution .... City buses, the
Greyhound Bus and taxicabs pass through the various map areas .....
[B]eing engaged in a passive activity such as being a mere passenger in
public transportation or private transportation would be a violation of the
condition. 64 Finally, the court found that while the condition "may be
related to future criminal conduct," it would only prevent the defendant
from committing such conduct in a "map area" and would have the
overall effect of simply "mov[ing] solicitors to other areas. 65 The
condition was therefore held unfit for the purpose of the defendant's
rehabilitation or the protection of the public.66 Holding that
"[p]articularized conditions of probation should be directed toward
rehabilitation rather than reliance upon some general condition which
utilizes a mechanized mass treatment approach," the court observed that
geographic restrictions that were much more specific and limited as to
time and location might be valid.67
This case recognizes three important bases of challenge to
exclusionary orders: First, unlike probationary conditions that aim
directly at criminal conduct, exclusionary orders prevent recipients from
engaging in even the most innocent of conduct within the targeted areas.
Second, exclusionary orders, perhaps because they fail to address the
causes of criminal conduct, have the likely effect of pushing this conduct
into other areas. Third, the use of pre-existing exclusionary zones departs
61. Id. at 563-64.
62. Id. at 564, 566.
63. Id. at 565.
64. Id. at 566.
65. Id.
66. Id. (holding that the condition was so sweeping and punitive that it was unrelated to the
defendant's rehabilitation).
67. Id. at 568.
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from the traditional, individualistic focus of probation, employing a"mechanized" approach.
Approaching the issue from a slightly different direction, the City
of New York6 8 sought to enjoin certain individuals, whom the city
planned to demonstrate were prostitutes, from being in public in a
particular predefined neighborhood during the hours of 11:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. 69 The court first noted that New York City recognized that both
the federal constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
state constitution protected a fundamental right to intrastate travel.
70
Accordingly, the court held that the injunction could only be granted if it
burdened the defendant's constitutional liberties no more than was
necessary to serve the governmental interests involved.7' Ultimately, the
court denied the injunction with the following:
[The] City seeks to prohibit all activity by the defendants in the
Queens Plaza area: good, bad or indifferent, lawful or unlawful,
innocent or guilty. The City seeks to proscribe the defendants'
presence in the area, when it is their activities of which it
complains. It thus restricts the defendants' liberties far more than is
necessary to prohibit the illegal activity.
72
Although the White court noted that exclusions more restricted in
time and place might pass muster,73 the Andrews court rejected a strictly
nighttime exclusion involving a fairly small area, demonstrating that
even a narrow exclusion may unconstitutionally restrict the right to travel
because it prevents not only illegal activity in the area but also prevents
targeted individuals from engaging in innocent activities in those areas.
Although SOAP-type orders have not been challenged on the
federal level, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed a
closely analogous situation in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati.74 In that
case, the City of Cincinnati, in order to "to enhance the quality of life and
protect the health, safety, and welfare of persons in neighborhoods with a
significantly higher incidence of conduct associated with drug abuse than
other areas of the City," enacted an ordinance 75 that prohibited those
68. City of New York v. Andrews, 719 N.Y.S.2d 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
69. Id. at 445.
70. Id. at 451-52.
71.Id. at 453.
72. Id.
73 See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
74. 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002).
75. Although not actually a probationary order, the Cincinnati drug exclusion zone ordinance
mirrors the purpose and approach of SOAP orders by excluding defendants from pre-established
exclusionary zones. Id. at 487. In theory, the Cincinnati ordinance actually provides greater
protection for defendants charged with violating it because it requires new charges to be filed,
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arrested for certain drug-related offenses from entering an area of the city
called Over the Rhine for ninety days and extended this exclusion for
twelve months for those who were eventually convicted.76
Johnson, who was arrested for a marijuana trafficking offense in
Over the Rhine, and Au France, who was arrested for possession of drug
paraphernalia, brought suit against the City of Cincinnati in federal
district court, alleging that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on
their First Amendment rights of association and speech and
unconstitutionally infringed on their fundamental liberty interest in
intrastate travel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.77 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
decided whether the Constitution protects a fundamental the right of
intrastate travel, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that right of
intrastate travel was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The
court further found that the Cincinnati ordinance substantially infringed
on this right and should, therefore, be strictly scrutinized.79 In so
deciding, the court rejected the City's argument that the ordinance should
be subjected to only intermediate scrutiny as a time, place, and manner
regulation. 80 The court held that while a less severe restriction of
localized travel might call for only intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance's
broad prohibition against entering the specific area, regardless of the
time or manner of access, required strict scrutiny.8'
Applying strict scrutiny, the Johnson court conceded that the City's
interest in reducing drug abuse, drug-related crime, and protecting the
health and safety of its citizens was compelling.82 However, the court
found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve these
goals.83 The court held that determining whether the ordinance was
sufficiently narrow required the court to "(1) assess whether the
Ordinance implicates an individual's interest in localized travel with
specific reference to the precise nature of the infringement and (2)
determine whether the Ordinance is the least restrictive means to
guaranteeing the defendant the full range of constitutional protections that attach to the criminal trial
process. The violation of a probationary order, however, leads to a revocation hearing, a process to
which substantially fewer protections adhere.
76. Id. at 487.
77. Id. at 489.
78. Id. at 498.
79. Id. at 502.
80. Id. The city based its argument on the holding in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3rd
Cir. 1990), in which the court upheld the City of York's anti-cruising ordinance after applying an
intermediate level of scrutiny based on a First Amendment time, place, and manner analysis.
81. Id. at 502.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 503.
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accomplish the City's goal. 84 The court defined the right of localized
travel as one of access and found that "[b]y blocking affected
individuals' access to an entire metropolitan neighborhood of 10,000
people, the Ordinance therefore plainly infringe[d] on the right to
localized travel through the public spaces and roadways of Over the
Rhine. 85
Based on the above standards, the court held that the city had failed
to carry the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance was the least
restrictive means possible.8 6 The court identified problems with the
ordinance. First, although the court credited the "general evidence" that
individuals arrested in Over the Rhine tended to re-offend, the court held
that "[t]he broad sweep of the ordinance [is] compounded by the fact that
the ordinance mete[d] out exclusion without any particularized finding
that a person is likely to engage in recidivist drug activity in Over the
Rhine." 87 Second, the court held that the ordinance presented"constitutional tailoring problems" because it excluded individuals from
the area "without regard for their reason for travel in the neighborhood,"
thus prohibiting a wide range of innocent and socially beneficial conduct
such as social and family contacts, seeking food and shelter, and
obtaining social services. 88 Third, the court acknowledged that the city
had demonstrated the difficulty of enforcing drug laws in the area but
found that without "some detail on the 'use of foot patrols, bicycle
patrols, and use of the District One Criminal Apprehension Team' . ..
such evidence does not demonstrate the ineffectiveness of other law
enforcement operations." 89 Finally, the court held that a particular
individual's ability to get a variance under the ordinance did not save the
ordinance from being unconstitutional because, "[i]n allowing
individuals to seek variances if they live or work or seek social services
in Over the Rhine, the Ordinance effectively preserves the right to travel
locally through public spaces and roadways for some individuals." 90
The cases examined in this subpart demonstrate that the
infringement on the right to intrastate travel posed by pre-existing
exclusionary zones has been held to serve as a sufficient basis to subject
such restrictions to a heightened form of scrutiny. Furthermore, these
cases illustrate four bases upon which this scrutiny may then lead to the
invalidation of such conditions: (1) the condition's indiscriminate
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 504.
87. Id. at 503.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 504.
90. Id. at 505.
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prohibition against legal and illegal activity in the described area,9' (2)92
the ability to help prevent re-offense only in the described area," (3) the
risk of simply moving prostitution activity to some other area,93 and (4)
the mass-produced, de-individualized approach to probation. 94
2. Challenges to the Use of Pre-Existing Exclusionary Zones in
Probationary Orders in Washington State
No appellate court in Washington has directly addressed the
constitutionality of a SOAP order. However, Washington courts
consistently uphold the use of pre-existing exclusionary zones in the
context of drug use and trafficking.
Although SOAP orders and ordinances in Washington have been
used largely on the municipal level, the Washington State Legislature has
enacted a "Protected Against Drug Trafficking Area"95 ("PADT") statute
that empowers courts to enter an off-limits order against a "known drug
trafficker," 96 prohibiting the individual from entering the PADT area 97
for up to one year.98 The orders may be issued pursuant to an application
for injunctive relief or as part of a criminal proceeding. 99
91. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); City of New York v. Andrews,
719 N.Y.S.2d 442, 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 503 (6th
Cir. 2002).
92. White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 568.
95. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.66.005-.900 (2002).
96. A known drug trafficker is defined as the following:
[Any person who has been convicted of a drug offense in this state, another state, or
federal court who subsequently has been arrested for a drug offense in this state. For
purposes of this definition, 'drug offense' means a felony violation of chapter 69.50 or
69.52 RCW or equivalent law in another jurisdiction that involves the manufacture,
distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute, of a controlled
substance or imitation controlled substance.
Id. § 10.66.010(3) (2002).
97. A PADT area is defined as the following:
[A]ny specifically described area, public or private, contained in an off-limits order. The
perimeters of a PADT area shall be defined using street names and numbers and shall
include all real property contained therein, where drug sales, possession of drugs,
pedestrian or vehicular traffic attendant to drug activity, or other activity associated with
drug offenses confirms a pattern associated with drug trafficking. The area may include
the full width of streets, alleys and sidewalks on the perimeter, common areas, planting
strips, parks and parking areas within the area described using the streets as boundaries.
Id. § 10.66.010(5).
98. Id. § 10.66.020 (2002).
99. An off-limits order may be issued as part of a civil action, a nuisance abatement action, an
eviction action, as a condition of pretrial release, or as a condition of sentencing in a criminal
proceeding. id. § 10.66.020.
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The PADT statute was challenged in State v. McBride.'°° The
defendant in that case was convicted of delivering a controlled substance
and was sentenced to twenty-nine months confinement, followed by one
year of community placement.10' One condition of the community
placement was that the defendant comply with an off-limits order
prohibiting him from entering the PADT of Spokane, where he had been
convicted. 102 McBride challenged the statute as being both over broad 0 3
and not rationally related to his crime.' 0 4 As mentioned above, the
Washington Supreme Court has held that the right to intrastate travel is
protected by the First Amendment of the federal constitution. 0 5 McBride
argued that the statute, by restricting the right to intrastate travel and the
right to move about freely, substantially infringed on protected
conduct. 0 6 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the statute
applied only to known drug traffickers and restricted such persons'
constitutional rights to only a limited extent because it applied only to
areas that were identified as having a pattern associated with drug
trafficking, and limited individuals' right to enter only the area in which
they were convicted.10 7
McBride also challenged the statute on the grounds that, as applied
to him, it was an unconstitutional limitation on his right to travel.' 0 8 In
rejecting this challenge, the court simply concluded that "reasonable
restrictions on travel during community supervision do not violate a
person's constitutional right to travel."' 0 9 Although the court does not
expand on its reasons for finding the restriction reasonable, the court did,
when addressing whether the restriction was rationally related to
McBride's crime, l" ° rely in part on the conclusory theory that
"[p]rohibiting Mr. McBride from returning to the area where his crime
was committed is . . . rationally related to the crime." ''
Although the court in McBride appeared to justify the use of a pre-
existing exclusionary zone on the PADT statute's narrow application to
known drug traffickers and its limit of excluding offenders only from the
100. 74 Wash. App. 460, 873 P.2d 589 (1994).
101. Id. at 463,873 P.2d at 592.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 466, 873 P.2d at 593.
105. Id. at 465 n.1, 873 P.2d at 593 n.1.
106. Id. at 464-65, 873 P.2d at 592-93.
107. Id. at 465, 873 P.2d at 593.
108. Id. at 466, 873 P.2d at 593.
109. Id. at 467, 873 P.2d at 594.
110. The court may impose and enforce crime-related prohibitions under the SRA. WASH.
REV. CODE 9.94A.505(8) (2002).
11I. State v. McBride, 74 Wash. App. 460, 466, 873 P.2d 589, 593 (1994).
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area in which they were convicted, subsequent cases have demonstrated
the courts' willingness to allow more expansive exclusions to be imposed
on those without prior convictions. For example, in State v. White," 2 a
criminal defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to
deliver. 13 As part of his community placement following incarceration,
the court ordered him to remain outside of all areas designated by the
Seattle Police as "Stay Out of Drug Areas" ("SODA").'' 4 Rather than
challenge the order on constitutional grounds, White argued that the
sentencing court exceeded its authority in imposing the exclusionary
condition because he had no prior drug convictions, thereby rendering
the PADT statute inapplicable.' 15 The court rejected this argument,
finding that the community placement statute provided that the court may
order that the offender "remain within, or outside of, a specified
geographical boundary[.]"' 16 As in McBride, the White court did not
recognize any distinction between an exclusionary order tailored to the
specific defendant before it and the use of a pre-existing exclusionary
zone. Both SODA areas and SOAP areas are defined by municipalities,
and neither has been subjected to a constitutional challenge to their use in
a probationary order.
White is the closest we have to a constitutional challenge to SODA
orders, and the brevity with which the court upheld the order suggests
that SOAP orders are not likely to trigger a more searching review.
Because neither the White nor the McBride court gave substantial weight
to the condition's indiscriminate prohibition against legal and illegal
activity in the described area,' ' or the fact that the conditions prevent re-
offense only in the described area," 8 or the risk of simply moving the
offending activity to some other area," 9 or the mass-produced, de-
individualized approach to probation, 120 these cases suggest that
challenging SOAP orders in Washington will be an uphill struggle.
112. 76 Wash. App. 801, 888 P.2d 169 (1995).
113. Id. at 803, 888 P.2d at 170.
114. Id. at 810, 888 P.2d at 174.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 811, 888 P.2d at 175. White was sentenced under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120
(1990). Id. at 811 n.9, 888 P.2d at 174 n.9. J
117. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); City of New York v. Andrews,
719 N.Y.S.2d 442, 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 503 (6th
Cir. 2002).
118. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 568.
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111. SOAP ORDERS: A BREAKDOWN IN THE PROBATIONARY SYSTEM
AND A FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH THE GOALS OF PROBATION
The judicial machinery is in place that is required for a heightened
appellate review of probationary orders that infringe on fundamental
constitutional rights. Moreover, Letourneau demonstrates that, at times,
this review will consist of a fairly rigorous examination of whether the
crimes and characteristics of individual probationers merit the conditions
in question. However, Riley and McBride indicate that this review can
sometimes be cursory, leading to the justification of conditions based on
broad generalizations about the defendant and the nature of the
defendant's crime. Finally, the cases described above demonstrate that
infringement on the right to intrastate travel has been held to serve as a
sufficient basis to use heightened scrutiny when examiing probationary
conditions that are based on pre-existing exclusionary zones.
Although the above cases establish persuasive precedent for a facial
challenge to SOAP orders, Washington courts, as described in the
previous section, have demonstrated a sympathetic attitude toward
geographic restrictions. Therefore, as described in the introduction, the
purpose of this paper is two-fold: First, it seeks to discourage the use of
SOAP orders on the district court level; second, it encourages
Washington appellate courts to apply strict scrutiny, as in Letourneau, to
determine whether the use of a SOAP order is appropriate in individual
cases. This section argues that the traditional justifications for appellate
court deference to trial courts' creation of probationary conditions are not
present in the context of SOAP orders. It argues that, according to
research into the factors that lead individuals into prostitution and trap
them within the industry, if appellate courts closely examine SOAP
orders, the courts will find that, in the majority of cases, SOAP orders do
not accomplish the historic or currently articulated goals of probation.
Section A briefly examines the historical purposes of probation, both
generally and in Washington. Section A further suggests that probation
has become detached from its original goal of rehabilitation, and that it
was this goal that initially justified and restrained the immense discretion
allowed to the trial courts. In the absence of the justifying and restraining
goal of rehabilitation, probationary conditions, particularly as applied to
prostitution, no longer deserve the deference they have traditionally
commanded. Section B argues that a close examination of the roots of
prostitution and the likely effect of SOAP orders on individual prostitutes
demonstrates that the orders will be inappropriate in the vast majority of
cases, further justifying heightened scrutiny.
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A. History of Probation: Appellate Deference to SOAP Orders Is Not
Justified by the Theoretical Basis of Trial Court Discretion in the
Creation of Probation Conditions
Probation has its roots in Massachusetts, arising from the now
familiar story of John Augustus, a shoemaker who, in 1841, began
bailing individuals out of jail who had been arrested for public
drunkenness and rehabilitating them.' 2' His success in this endeavor
eventually led Massachusetts to institute a formal probationary system. 1
2
From there, the use of probation quickly spread throughout the
country. 123 The public's increasing chagrin with the retributivist focus of
the criminal law and an increasing belief that some offenders could be
rehabilitated and made productive members of society fueled the rapid
spread of probation. 124 This early focus on rehabilitation was carried into
the twentieth century and is captured by Chief Justice Taft who wrote
that the purpose of probation was to give:
[Y]oung and new violators of law a chance to reform and to escape
the contaminating influence of association with hardened or veteran
criminals in the beginning of the imprisonment .... If the case was
a proper one, great good could be done in stopping punishment by
putting the new criminal on probation. The avoidance of
imprisonment at time of sentence was therefore the period to which
the advocates of a Probation Act always directed their urgency.
Probation was not sought to shorten the term. Probation is the
attempted saving of a man who has taken one wrong step, and
whom the judge thinks to be a brand who can be plucked from the
burning at the time of the imposition of the sentence. 125
This spirit of rehabilitation infused Washington's application of
probation through the 1970s and into the early 1980S.126
121. NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 7 (1983).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1928).
126. See State v. Barr, 99 Wash. 2d 75, 79, 658 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1983) (en banc) (holding that
the purpose of restitution as a probationary condition is primarily rehabilitative); State v. Kuhn, 81
Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972) (en banc) in which the court opined the following:
[T]he nature and purpose of probation has been well established by this court ... The
granting of a deferred sentence and probation, following a plea or verdict of guilty, is a
rehabilitative measure, and as such is not a "matter of right but is a matter of grace,
privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving and withheld from the undeserving,"
within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Id. at 650, 503 P.2d at 1062 (citations omitted). State v. Hall, 35 Wash. App. 302, 307, 666 P.2d 930,
933 (1983) (holding that "[air important goal of sentencing is to provide an opportunity for
rehabilitation of the defendant so that he or she can resume a productive role in the community.
Probation is a means by which judges may provide defendants with this opportunity.").
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Because the purpose of probation was understood to be
rehabilitation, the process of imposing conditions was premised on the
court coming to understand the particular needs of the individual in each
case and shaping the conditions accordingly. 127 Reflecting this concern,
the National Advisory Commission on Corrections Standards wrote,
"[i]n too many cases, courts mechanically adopt standard conditions for
all probationers. Conditions should be tailored to fit the needs of the
offenders and society, and no conditions should be imposed unless
necessary for these purposes."'' 28
Because probationary conditions were to be tailored to individuals,
statutes authorizing courts to impose probation did not generally require
or direct the court to impose any particular conditions. 129 A judge was
expected to come to know and understand the defendant in a particular
case and create conditions suited particularly to that individual's
needs. 130 Moreover, the goal of rehabilitation dictated that courts be
empowered to impose conditions for sufficient periods to allow for
meaningful change. Even if a public drunkenness statute authorized a
court to impose a prison sentence of only a matter of months, a
probationary statute might allow for the imposition of conditions lasting
longer than a year as, after all, no one could expect an alcoholic to give
up drinking in ninety days.
Probationary statutes imposing length restrictions led Charles
Chute, the Executive Director of the National Probation and Parole
Association, to complain in 1974, that "unfortunately, some states
attempt to limit the maximum term of probation to one year, or even less.
The best laws leave the matter of the term as well as all other conditions
of probation to be decided by the judge on the basis of individual
needs." 131 Thus, trial courts were afforded enormous discretion in
shaping probation conditions and appellate courts gave a great deal of
deference to trial courts' decisions on these matters. The trial judge was
expected to come to know the needs of the defendant in question and
decided whether he or she was deserving or undeserving. 32 Further,
because the purpose of the conditions was rehabilitation, courts were
127. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 121, at 46.
128. GEORGE G. KILLINGER ET Al., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 81-82 (1976).
129. See id. at 39-40 (describing recommendations that "statutes refrain from making specific
conditions for probation, leaving the matter open for the exercise by the judge of his best judgment
based upon the most up to date information about the defendant and about the treatment facilities
and programs available....
130. Id. at 40.
131. Charles L. Chute, The Development of Probation in the United States, in PROBATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 234 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1974).
132. See State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 888, 376 P.2d 646, 649 (1962).
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permitted to impose them for periods of time much longer than would be
justified if a jail sentence had been imposed.
The rehabilitative rationale for criminal justice declined enormously
in popularity in the 1980s and 1990s.133 Politicians around the country
began running for public office based on promises to "get tough on
crime," and the retributivist rationale of criminal justice ascended to
renewed popularity. 34 One commentator has written, "[i]t seems clear
that the public has largely lost faith in the rehabilitative ideal as a
foundation for any penal system, adult or juvenile."' 35 Whereas the
rehabilitative concept of criminal justice entailed a focus on individuals,
the new retributivist order brought with it suspicion of judges' leniency
and disparate sentences handed down for similar offenses. 136 Based on
this suspicion, legislatures, both on the national and state levels, began
enacting mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which established
punishments based largely on the offense committed rather than on the
offender. 137
This evolution away from rehabilitation as a theoretical basis for
criminal sanction also took place in Washington and can be observed
through both the legislature's and the courts' changing attitudes toward
probation. At the felony level, under Washington's Sentencing Reform
Act ("SRA"), which makes a period of community placement a
requirement, 38 the Washington Supreme Court has declared that the
purpose of this community placement is "primarily to further the punitive
133. See generally Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and
the Conservative "Backlash, " 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003); see also Theresa A. Hughes, Juvenile
Delinquent Rehabilitation: Placement of Juveniles Beyond Their Communities as a Detriment to
Inner City Youths, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 153, 161 (2001).
134. Feld, supra note 133, at 1451, 1502 (discussing determinate sentencing, elimination of
parole boards, and a general "conservative backlash" and "get tough" on crime approach to criminal
justice); see also TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 420-28 (5th ed.
2000) (attributing a doubling in the size of prison populations since the 1980s to "get tough on crime
policies").
135. Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive
Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 65
(1999).
136. Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1852-53 (1994).
137. Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Crime, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 389, 390 (1996).
[These] statutes purport to be an accurate reflection of an offender's culpability, yet they
base punishment almost solely upon a consideration of the nature of the crime committed.
Therefore, a sentence based on the defendant's actual culpability is the exception and not
the rule in a system of harsh sentences targeted at mid to high level participants in a
crime.
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.700 (2002).
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purposes of deterrence and protection."' 3 9 Similarly, discussion of
rehabilitation as a judicial justification for a probationary condition
imposed as a result of a misdemeanor violation has all but disappeared.
For example, in State v. Swanson, 140 the court simply left "rehabilitation"
out of the familiar justification for probationary conditions:
Probation outside the SRA is not a matter of right but a matter of
grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving, and withheld
from the undeserving, as sound official discretion may dictate. In
this older version of probation, which remains applicable to
misdemeants, a court may impose probationary conditions that bear
a reasonable relation to the defendant's duty to make restitution or
that tend to prevent the future commission of crimes. 141
At the same time that the criminal justice system was discarding the
individualism of rehabilitation and swinging toward the retributivist
philosophy of mandatory minimum sentences, America's perceptions of
prostitution were in flux. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
prostitution was understood as a crime against morality, and prostitutes
were described as "fallen women."'142 In the latter part of the twentieth
century, however, prostitution came to be understood not from the
individual prostitute's perspective, but instead as a quality-of-life crime
inflicted on the residents of the neighborhoods in which prostitution took
place. 143 Concerns regarding children, neighborhood decay, and property
values became the most common complaints associated with street-level
prostitution and, accordingly, nationwide law-enforcement policy
evolved from intervention toward containment and the occasional
crackdown, or "sweep-up" projects. 44 The shifting understanding of
prostitution has created interesting problems for law enforcement and the
judicial system. A superior court judge in San Francisco writes the
following:
The victim-perpetrator status of the defendant is only one of
numerous contradictions. Everyone touched by the problem-
139. State v. Ross, 129 Wash. 2d 279, 286, 916 P.2d 405, 409 (1996) (en banc) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Slemmer, 48 Wash. App. 48, 59-60, 738 P.d 281, 288 (1987) (no longer
describing restitution as rehabilitative but holding instead that "[t]he objectives of allowing
restitution as an alternative to imprisonment are to provide reparation to the victims of crime and to
prevent future offenses").
140. 116 Wash. App. 67, 77, 65 P.3d 343, 348 (2003).
141. Id. at 77, 65 P.3d at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., State v.
Williams, 97 Wash. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687, 691 (1999) (holding same).
142. Ronald Weitzer, Prostitution Control in America: Rethinking Public Policy, 32 CRIME,
LAW & SOC. CHANGE 83, 84 (1999).
143. Id. at 85.
144. Id.
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homeowners, merchants, law enforcement officers, judicial staff,
and even the sex worker-operates in an environment of conflicting
attitudes. Consider the homeowner who wants the street worker off
his or her block but will rarely vote to convict when serving on a
jury.
45
This, then, is the history of the SOAP order. The SOAP order's
wide geographic breadth and long two-year term arose out of an
unbounded probationary statute designed to give judges who have come
to know the individual needs of particular offenders the discretion to
impose conditions that will address divergent idiosyncrasies. Current
SOAP orders' mechanized, one-size-fits-all application of pre-existing
exclusionary zones to all those found guilty of a prostitution offense
reflects the de-individualizing force of the philosophical swing away
from rehabilitation and toward retributive criminal justice policies. The
SOAP order's cleansing objective reflects an understanding of
prostitution that is no longer tied to a moralistic and individualized focus
on particular prostitutes as "fallen women" and instead focuses on
community quality of life. Finally, the SOAP order's ease of
enforcement-a probation violation rather than a new offense which
must be put before a jury that is often unwilling to convict the individual
face of the problem they simultaneously want to be rid of-bypasses
society's uneasy and ambivalent understanding of prostitution.
This history reveals that the traditional justification for appellate
deference to trial courts' probationary conditions simply does not apply
to SOAP orders. No judge has come to know the individual subjects of
SOAP orders, assessed the probationer's needs, and carefully shaped the
conditions accordingly. Instead, SOAP orders reflect an assembly line
approach that focuses, if at all, solely on the various communities who
managed to complain loudly enough and long enough to have themselves
declared areas of prostitution. 146 Whereas appellate courts could once be
confident that the enormous discretion exercised by trial courts in
shaping probationary conditions was restrained by personal knowledge
of the offender and a sincere desire to facilitate rehabilitation, SOAP
orders represent a goal that stands outside this traditional area of judicial
145. Kay Tsenin, One Judicial Perspective on the Sex Trade, in RESEARCH ON WOMEN AND
GIRLS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1999 CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION - ENHANCING POLICY AND PRACTICE THROUGH RESEARCH, Vol. 3,
No. 17 (Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice Research Forum,
2000) available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/180973.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
146. Although it is possible for trial courts to shape SOAP orders to the particular defendant
before them, the availability from the city map office of a map, supra note 21, depicting city wide
SOAP areas, although in no way conclusive proof, tends to militate against the belief that judges
frequently, if ever, individualize SOAP orders.
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competence: social engineering carried out through the pseudo ad hoc
creation of zoning ordinances, generally a legislative function not
typically entrusted to the courts. A trial judge is unlikely to have any
means of assessing the effect of such orders on overall rates of
prostitution, neighborhood safety, or the individual offender before the
judge. For these reasons, the traditional justification for appellate
deference to probationary conditions in the form of SOAP orders has
evaporated. Thus, when SOAP orders are challenged on appeal, there is
no reason for the court to grant deference to the trial court judge. Instead,
because the orders infringe on the fundamental constitutional right of
intrastate travel, appellate courts should apply the heightened scrutiny
these orders justly deserve.
B. SOAP Orders Are Unlikely to Accomplish the Goals of Probation
The previous section demonstrated that appellate deference to the
imposition of SOAP orders as part of probation is no longer justified by
the traditional rationale of individual rehabilitation. For this reason,
appellate courts should apply heightened scrutiny, required by
probationary conditions that infringe on fundamental rights, to SOAP
orders. This section examines what courts are likely to find when they
examine SOAP orders, and argues that, because SOAP orders are
unlikely to advance any of the traditional or contemporary goals of
probation, they should neither be imposed by trial courts nor upheld by
appellate courts in most cases.
In Washington, the most commonly articulated goals of probation
for misdemeanor violations are the prevention of re-offense and the
making of restitution. 147 However, restitution is not generally applicable
to prostitution offenses. The prevention of future offenses can be broken
down into two subgoals: keeping the specific defendant before the court
from re-offending, and promoting community safety through the proper
application of probation conditions.1 48 Subpart one of this section argues
that a clear understanding of the causes that both lead individuals into
prostitution and keep them there reveals that geographic exclusion from
particular sections of a city is highly unlikely to deter the majority of
such individuals from re-offending. Subpart two argues that, while
SOAP orders may reduce prostitution in a particular neighborhood, the
orders, because they drive prostitution underground and away from
social services, will likely lead to an increase in danger to the overall
147. See State v. Swanson, 116 Wash. App. 67, 77, 65 P.3d 343, 348 (2003); State v. Williams,
97 Wash. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687, 691 (1999).
148. COHEN& GOBERT, supra note 121, at 182-84.
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community in the form of greater rates of disease and an increase in
violent crime against prostitutes.
1. SOAP Orders Unlikely to Prevent Re-Offense
In order to assess whether excluding a person convicted of
prostitution from the areas of a city in which a significant amount of
prostitution activity occurs will make it less likely that that individual
will re-offend, it is necessary to explore the reasons why individuals
enter the sex trade in the first place.
Two researchers conducted a study in the San Francisco Bay Area
in which two hundred juvenile and adult, current and former, female
street prostitutes participated as subjects. 149 When asked why they had
entered prostitution, most cited an immediate need for money; more than
three-quarters of them reported having no other options.1 50 Furthermore,
more than 90 percent of the women who came from poor backgrounds,
and almost all of the juveniles, felt they had no other options.
15 1
Additionally, a desperate need for money appears to be only the
final push in what is a lifetime of preparation for the industry. Sixty
percent reported being sexually exploited as juveniles, with 70 percent of
those reporting juvenile sexual abuse also reported repeated abuse by the
same person; and 62 percent reported having been beaten while growing
up. 152 More than 50 percent of those interviewed reported alcohol abuse,
and 92 percent reported drug use in the homes from which they had
fled. 53 The authors also reported that the average age at which the
individuals entered prostitution was 16.1 years old, and that by age 16.9
they were working regularly as prostitutes. 154 The eight months
difference revealed, according to the authors, "a reluctant entrance into
the street life."' 155
Sixty-eight percent of the subjects reported suffering from
psychological and emotional problems prior to entering prostitution.1
56
The authors additionally identified the lack of a social support system as
contributing to the isolation that eventually led the subjects into "a life of
149. Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Entrance Into Prostitution, 13 YOUTH & SOCIETY 471
(1982). There are numerous studies of prostitution that describe factors similar to those that were
presented by Silbert and Pines. In each study, the percentage and categories vary somewhat. This
study was chosen because it is fairly representative of the average results, and because the article
presents a comparison between the authors' data and data derived by other studies.
150. Id. at 486.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 478-480.
153. Id. at 478.
154. Id. at 483.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 485.
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crime, drug addiction, and self identification as a prostitute. '' 57
Summarizing these and other results, the authors state the following:
In general, the present study identified two patterns in the process of
entering prostitution. The more prevalent pattern involved white
juveniles, from above average economic backgrounds, with severely
disturbed patterns of growth, punctuated by physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse at home. The young women generating this
particular pattern ran away from home to escape molestation; and
because of their young age, history of abuse, loneliness, poverty on
the street, and inexperience, started working for a pimp (generally
they were overtly recruited by a pimp or by a woman working for a
pimp). Once on the street, they continued to show an even higher
degree of victimization.
The second, less prevalent pattern, involved minority women
coming from low socioeconomic backgrounds where crime, drug
abuse, and prostitution were prevalent. They start prostitution
primarily because of economic pressure in the home.158
One possible rationale for the use of pre-existing exclusionary
zones in probationary orders is that by severing the individual from
friends and social environments, the likelihood that the individual will
re-offend will decrease. 59 The above study demonstrates that this
rationale is largely inapplicable to the context of prostitution. Few
women who enter prostitution are lured into the life by the friends and
social connections in their home environment. Instead, most enter
prostitution only after fleeing abuse in their home environment where
they had little or no social network. Moreover, these women enter
prostitution only because they feel they have no other options, are
desperate for money, and have been trained to understand themselves as
victims of aggression and abuse. Prostitution, unlike a drug addiction, is
not a habit to be broken, but a desperate way to obtain money when no
other path seems available.
Additionally, the Pines and Silbert study demonstrates that women
in prostitution have virtually no other means of self-support and leads to
the conclusion that exclusion will, if effective at all, only repeat the
alienation that initially led women into prostitution and drive them into
157. Id. at 495-496.
158. Id. at 491-92.
159. See United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a supervised
release order was reasonable, under which the individual was required to obtain permission from her
probation officer before entering two counties in Pennsylvania, because there was ample evidence
that if the individual returned to the area in which she grew up, she was highly likely to re-enter her
old life of crime).
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the same work in some other form or location. In other words, fleeing to
a new city and beginning work as a prostitute is not a novel dynamic for
many of these individuals. Because the women in the survey fled their
homes prior to turning eighteen and were working regularly as prostitutes
before the age of seventeen,1 60 it is reasonable to conclude that the vast
majority of the individuals who enter prostitution lack a high school
diploma or any legitimate work experience.' 6 1 Therefore, excluding them
from a particular area will not cause them to seek other forms of
employment because they lack the skills or knowledge required for
virtually any job other than prostitution. In addition, the severe
psychological problems that young prostitutes face make it difficult for
them to function in a mainstream workplace.
Additionally, the Silbert and Pines study also points to the absence
of a social support network as one factor leading individuals who have
entered prostitution to flee their homes in the first place. 162 A SOAP
order may serve to again sever the individual from what social support
network he or she has managed to build and will only cause him or her to
run away again, repeating the cycle of alienation and vulnerability. Thus,
it is difficult to believe that exclusion from a particular geographical area
will do anything other than cause individuals in prostitution to relocate to
a different area, city, or state, as they did when they first entered.
Therefore, SOAP orders accomplish no more than a deepening of the
individual's problems and merely transfer the larger social problem of
prostitution to other jurisdictions.163
Before concluding that SOAP orders do nothing to prevent re-
offense, it is helpful to examine the forces that hold individuals in the
prostitution industry. Eighty to ninety percent of prostitutes are
controlled by pimps. 164 "Pimp-procured prostitutes" is one of several
subgroups that have been found to be likely to experience "Stockholm
Syndrome," 65a process by which a hostage comes to bond and identify
with her captor and his perspective on the world. 166 Potential
160. See Silbert & Pines, supra note 149, at 483.
161. Id. at 484-85 (finding that "only 19% [of the prostitutes surveyed] were attending school
at the time of their first prostitution involvement: 81% were not in school, despite the fact that 78%
of them were of school age at the time. Only 14% were employed when they started prostitution.").
162. SILBERT & PINES, supra note 149, at 495-97.
163. See Weitzer, supra note 142, at 84 ("At best, [prostitution] is contained within a particular
area where prostitutes are occasionally subject to the revolving door of arrest, fines, brief jail time,
and release or displaced into another locale .. ") (emphasis in original).
164. See generally Susan Kay Hunter, Prostitution Is Cruelty and Abuse to Women and
Children, I MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 100 (1993) (symposium on prostitution).
165. DEE L. R. GRAHAM, LOVING TO SURVIVE: SEXUAL TERROR, MEN'S VIOLENCE, AND
WOMEN'S LIVES 30-61 (1994) (synthesizing the literature on the Stockholm Syndrome).
166. Id. at 136.
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manifestations of this syndrome include a denial of the captor's violence
against her and a focus on the captor's positive side, feeling closer to and
desiring to be closer to the captor than to persons with whom she has an
empowering relationship, taking on the captor's perspective as her own,
and finding it psychologically and emotionally difficult or impossible to
physically leave or emotionally detach from the captor, particularly if the
captor does not want her to leave.167 Both pimps and batterers use "social
isolation, minimization and denial, threats, intimidation, verbal and
sexual abuse, [an] attitude of ownership, and extreme physical violence
to control women."' 68 "Street based sex workers living in poverty tend to
experience homelessness and incarceration, and rely on prostitution as
their major source of income.'' 69
Being homeless significantly increased the risk of being abused by
commercial partners. Respondents who had been incarcerated
during the past year were more likely to be physically abused by
commercial partners than those who had not .... If sex work was
the major source of income, the woman was more likely to be
physically... and sexually... abused by commercial partners than
her counterparts. 70
Indeed, "partner violence and substance abuse are reciprocal in
nature . . . substance abuse increases the risk for future physical and
sexual assault[, which] increases the risk of subsequent substance
abuse."'71
It is clear that many individuals working in the prostitution industry
are locked in a cycle of drug dependency and violence, at both the hands
of their customers and their pimps. The extreme mental trauma produced
by this cycle, in tandem with the psychological manipulations of pimps,
leads to the development of Stockholm Syndrome, making individuals
within the industry psychologically and emotionally dependent on the
very individuals who enact, facilitate, and perpetuate their torture. Given
this dynamic, it is almost impossible to imagine that excluding these
individuals from geographical areas within a particular city will help
167. Id. at 44.
168. Melissa Farley & Vanessa Kelly, Prostitution: A Critical Review of the Medical and
Social Sciences Research, I I WOMEN & CRIM. JUST., No. 4, 29, 45 (2000).
169. Nabila EI-Bassel et al., Correlates of Partner Violence Among Female Street-Based Sex
Workers: Substance Abuse. History of Childhood Abuse, and HIV Risks, 15 AIDS PATIENT CARE
AND STDs 41,49 (200 1).
170. Id. at 46-47.
171. Id. at 42 (quoting Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., A 2-Year Longitudinal Analysis of the
Relationships Between Violent Assault and Substance Use in Women, 65 J. CONSULT. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 834, 841 (1997) (supporting a vicious cycle hypothesis for illicit drug use among women
who had also been assaulted)).
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them to avoid re-offending. Pimps, who through violence and emotional
and psychological manipulation enslave the women who work for them,
will not simply allow these individuals to pick up and begin a new life
because of a municipal probationary order.
Even ignoring the power of pimps to hold individuals within
prostitution, prostitutes are impoverished, often homeless, and dependent
on the sex trade for income. These are not individuals who have carefully
selected a career and life style by thoughtfully weighing the pros and
cons of the various options from a long list of possible choices. Instead,
prostitution is the final alternative, a desperate non-choice, and a trap. A
SOAP order will not cause the vast majority of these individuals to make
a different choice and pursue a new life because, simply, there is no other
choice for them, and SOAP orders do nothing to create new
opportunities. Even if we were to briefly entertain the naive fantasy that
all, or even most, individuals choose to remain prostitutes because they
find it a viable career and are capable, at any given moment, of selecting
a new life, it is not rational to believe that individuals who have been
driven from the industry by often brutal, ongoing physical and sexual
assault will seek new lives and legitimate employment as a result of
being excluded from certain city blocks.
Before finally concluding that pre-existing exclusionary zones fail
the requirement of being reasonably necessary to help individuals
engaged in prostitution avoid re-offending, it is helpful to understand the
needs of individuals working as prostitutes when they seek escape. Dr.
Boyer's report172 asserts the following:
[W]orking in the sex industry is not having a job you can just walk
away from. It is more than work, it is a lifestyle of endurance;
finding the next place you can numb the pain for awhile. All of the
women [who were interviewed for the report] had tried many times
to find a way out of sex industry work but were always "thrown
back. 171
Existing services are not geared toward helping women in the sex
industry address problems with sexual trauma. 174 Additionally, women
attempting to escape the industry are confronted with a lack of long-term
solutions to their housing needs, a lack of availability of health care, an
inability to obtain treatment for substance abuse, and an inability to
secure counseling. 75 Unfortunately, conventional services such as
172. BOYER ET AL., supra note 10. Dr. Boyer's findings are not unique but are focused upon
because of their geographical relevance.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. at 16.
175. Id. at 18-20.
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employment training and skills development are ineffective in helping
women within the sex industry develop alternatives. 176 These services
failed for this group for the following reasons:
[M]ost of [the] women had been on the street or in other forms of
sex industry work since their early teens. Their skills are far more
limited than others using these programs; they did not have the
prerequisite skills to function in these program ... [and] they had
not achieved enough stability including securing of daily basic
needs, to be able to succeed in these programs.
Finally, the effect SOAP orders had on these women's ability to
form new lives is significant as the bulk of services for basic survival, as
well as long-term resources needed by prostitutes, are located in SOAP
areas. 78 Moreover, the ineffectiveness of SOAP orders in driving
individuals out of prostitution is evidenced by the commonly cited
recidivism rate of eighty percent for cities similar in size to Seattle. 179
Also, as shown in Exhibit 2, the number of prostitution charges in Seattle
has steadily risen over the past seven years, particularly in census tracts
containing SOAP areas.' 80
SOAP orders not only fail to take even a step toward meeting the
needs of individuals working in the prostitution industry who actually
wish to escape, but appear to frustrate this objective. Also, as shown in
Exhibit 2, SOAP orders bisect the city, creating islands of exclusion that
prevent individuals within the industry from availing themselves of the
scant resources that purportedly exist to assist them, and tend to separate
individuals from whatever social support networks they have managed to
create, thereby frustrating their attempts to lead normal lives.'81 Because
SOAP orders do nothing to attend to the needs of those who wish to
escape the sex-work industry, their likely effect is simply to drive women
into other urban communities. Rather than pushing individuals out of the
industry, this forced transplantation simply replays the dislocation that
originally led such desperate and poor people to enter the sex-work
industry in the first place.
176. Id. at 18.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 26.
179. SEATTLE WOMEN'S COMM'N, PROJECT TO ADDRESS AND THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND
SERVICE BARRIERS FACING WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY, A REPORT TO MAYOR OF SEATTLE,
NORMAN B. RICE AND THE SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL 6 (July 1995) (report based in part on the Boyer
study).
180. City of Seattle Police Department, Crime Data available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/
police/crime/stats.htm (last visited July 18, 2004).
181. BOYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 5, 9.
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2. SOAP Orders Negatively Impact Public Safety, Driving Prostitution
Further Underground, Making Access by Law Enforcement, Health Care
Workers, and Other Social Services More Difficult
Just as SOAP orders provide little incentive for individuals
convicted of prostitution to get out of the sex-work industry, these orders
also fail to promote public order or safety on any large scale. But, before
analyzing the likely effects of SOAP orders on public safety, it is
necessary to formulate what, exactly, constitutes the "danger" of
prostitution. Case law in Washington provides evidence that the
individual act of prostitution is not considered to be a threat to public
safety. For example, in State v. WS,' 82 a juvenile was found guilty of
offering and agreeing to an act of prostitution.' 83 The defendant appealed
on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion to remand
the case to diversion.' 84 The appellate court found that the prosecutor's
office handling the case had adopted a policy that all juvenile cases of
prostitution were inappropriate for diversion.1 85 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's denial, stating that the legislative intent of the
diversion statute was the following:
[P]rovide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities
whenever consistent with public safety . . . [and] [p]rostitution as
charged in this case, is an illegal act that involves 'no threat of or
instance of actual physical harm.' Thus, the crime with which WS
was charged was viewed by the Legislature as such a minor offense
that it could be dismissed without even the necessity for a
diversionary agreement.186
The court's opinion in State v. WS demonstrates that neither that
court nor the Washington Legislature understand the act of prostitution to
present an immediate threat of physical danger to the community. In
defining the danger posed by prostitution we must then look elsewhere.
Perhaps the real harm of prostitution has more to do with the impact that
prostitution can have on our society's quality of life.
In decades past, solicitation was considered a victimless crime. In
the 1990s, it was transformed into a quality-of-life crime (that is, a
crime that is not wrong in itself but that interferes with the quality
of life of other people-merchants, tourists, and neighbors). In
reality, no matter how supportive people may be of sex workers,
182.40 Wash. App. 835, 700 P.2d 1192 (1985).
183. Id. at 836-37, 700 P.2d at 1194.
184. Id. at 837, 700 P.2d at 1194.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 837, 700 P.2d at 1194 (emphasis in original).
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they do not want to witness solicitation in front of their homes, on
their street corners, or in front of their neighborhood restaurants.'
87
From the beginning, then, we needed look no further than the name
of the orders themselves: SOAP. Their purpose lies solely in cleansing
neighborhoods of pollutants which, in this case, happen to be people.
Driving this point home, the Washington Legislature in 1991 passed a
bill directing the superintendent of public instruction to include a "social
hazard" category in the "hazardous walking conditions" definition
applicable to public schools that included, among other things, areas with
unacceptable levels of prostitution and toxic waste dumps. 88 These
sources focus on the "dangerousness" of prostitution and reveal that
prostitution is imagined as less of a physical danger and more of an
unpleasantness, something we would simply prefer not to see. On one
level, it might be argued that this constitutes a fairly slim justification for
criminalization in the first place, but it also demonstrates that our
treatment of prostitution has little to do with the individual prostitutes.
Instead, it reaffirms that our goal in applying SOAP orders is not
rehabilitation or even specific deterrence. Instead, the goal of SOAP
orders is to push prostitutes out of certain neighborhoods or jurisdictions
into unseen comers of our larger community. While it may be that SOAP
orders accomplish these goals-though the statistics presented in Part II
might indicate otherwise-it forces us to question what effect this under-
the-rug policy has on our community.
In answering this question, it is helpful to examine three potential,
but less frequently considered dangers of prostitution: disease, drug use,
and violent crime against prostitutes. Experts who study prostitution
know that as prostitution is pushed underground, disease rates and
violence against prostitutes increase while drug use continues undeterred.
In her study on prostitution in the Seattle area, Dr. Boyer estimates
that only ten to twenty percent of prostitution takes place on the street. 89
The vast majority of those working in prostitution operate out of bars,
cafes, hotels, escort services, massage parlors, advertisements, exotic
dancing clubs, and private homes. 90 The women interviewed by Dr.
Boyer believed that as street prostitution becomes more dangerous or less
profitable, individuals working in prostitution have moved into other
187. Tsenin, supra note 145, at 18.
188. S. B. 5114, § 5, 52d Leg. (Wash. 1991) (enacted). The provisions of this bill were never
codified, apparently because the bill was not funded. See id. § 6 (providing that the act shall be null
and void should specific funding not be provided by June 30, 1991).
189. BOYER ET AL., supra note 10 at 9.
190. Id.
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venues of the sex-work industry.' 9' Dr. Boyer found that "it is common
for them to develop lists of regular clients they can trust or to work for
escort services" or try to get jobs in the exotic dancing industry. 92
Similarly, Catrine Donegan, analyzing prostitution in London, found the
following:
[A]ttempts to eradicate the sex industry have failed. As long as
there is a demand, the service will remain and attempts to curb it
will only drive commercial sex underground in a way that obstructs
attempts to promote safe sex and bring about health behavior
changes . . .neither the threat of disease nor stigma, abuse or
imprisonment have deterred women from working as prostitutes.
193
Assessing that demand, an assistant deputy superintendent for the
Hampden County Sheriffs Department in Springfield, Massachusetts,
asserted that studies showed that there are ten customers for every
prostitute. 194 DeCou also asserts the following:
[P]rostitutes have become isolated in the community due to
criminalization. In light of social stigma and financial factors, it is
extremely difficult for prostitutes to find and hold legitimate
employment. Thus, many are forced underground and into
association with pimps and other criminal activity, particularly the
illegal use, sale and trade of drugs for sex.19 5
Indeed, unless society provides meaningful services to individuals
within the sex industry, arrest and conviction of prostitutes virtually
guarantees recidivism and does little to change or eliminate
prostitution. 196
These studies make it clear that SOAP orders, despite their
ineffectiveness, are not likely to end anytime soon. 197 Moreover, it
appears that as the prostitution industry is driven further underground, it
may come to pose an even greater risk to public safety, order, and health
because individuals who are driven underground are generally
discouraged from seeking medical advice.' 98 In addition, "[w]ith the
threat of arrest .. .prostitutes are isolated from necessary health and
191./d. at I1.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Catrine Donegan, Prostitutes Can Help Prevent the Transmission of HIV, 92 NURSING
TIMES, June 1996, No. 26, 38.
194. Kate Decou, US. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare Is Served, 24 Ni- w ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 428 (1998).
195. Id. at 445 (internal citations omitted).
196. Tsenin, supra note 145, at 16-17.
197. See supra note 24 and accompanying Exhibit I.
198. Donegan, supra note 193, at 38.
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social services which could protect [them] and others from diseases and
illnesses."' 199
As the preceding sections demonstrate, SOAP orders are likely to
be inadequate in meeting the stated purposes of probation, specific
deterrence, community protection, and rehabilitation stripped of their
undeserved appellate deference. SOAP orders thus cannot justify their
resulting infringement on the fundamental right of intrastate travel.
IV. CONCLUSION
History has left many stains on our "American character," and the"oppression now exercised on a helpless people depending on our
magnanimity and justice for the preservation of their existence, 200 from
SOAP orders is yet another. Perhaps in 50 or 100 years we will regret
considering human beings as pollutants. Perhaps there will be a public
apology, or perhaps this group will remain forever powerless, without a
lobby to coerce another speech about how this must never happen again.
However, should that day of contrition arrive, we will likely realize that
prostitution, in the vast majority of cases, is not a career choice or a habit
to be broken. For many individuals, prostitution is a prison perpetuated
by violence and alienation. If we truly want to facilitate individuals'
escape from this prison, a great deal more thought and planning is
required than what has gone into the cleansing project of SOAP orders.
In the meantime, we must refuse to allow those meager protections that
are in place to be bypassed. SOAP orders are a perversion of a
probationary system built on the ideal of individual rehabilitation; they
represent an unchecked project of social engineering and community
cleansing.
The machinery is in place for appellate courts to genuinely analyze
these orders and to discover whether, in any particular case, they are
reasonably likely to accomplish the goals of probation. This increased
scrutiny in turn will require municipal courts to consider the needs and
characteristics of the individuals before them, to apply the ingenuity and
discretion for which the probation system was designed, and to stir those
courts from the rote, mechanized, industrial line of justice represented by
SOAP orders.
199. Decou, supra note 194, at 427.
200. BOBBITr, supra note 2, at 118 (1984).
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